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Is Area Yield Insurance 
Competitive with 
Farm Yield Insurance? 
Barry J. Barnett, J. Roy Black, Yingyao Hu, 
and  Jerry R. Skees 
This article compares risk reduction from MPCI and GFtP crop insurance contracts. 
The analysis extends and improves on the existing area-yield insurance literature 
in four important respects. First, the geographical scope greatly exceeds that of 
previous work. Second, unlike previous efforts, the area is not assumed to consist 
only of  those farms included in the analysis. Third, the analysis is based on the 
actual GRP indemnity function rather than the area-yield indemnity function 
commonly used in the literature.  Fourth, the analysis avoids the questionable 
assumption that GRP scale can be optimized at  the individual farm level. Even with 
a  number of  consemative assumptions  favoring MPCI relative  to GFtP, results 
indicate that at  least for some crops and regions GRP is aviable alternative to MPCI. 
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Introduction 
The Federal Crop Insurance Program (FCIP),  administered by the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture's Risk Management Agency (RMA), facilitates provision of a variety of yield 
and revenue insurance contracts to crop farmers. For some of  the currently available 
FCIP contracts, indemnity payments are  triggered by losses measured at  the farm level. 
For others, indemnity payments are triggered by losses measured at an area (county) 
level. The contracts can be  further classified according to the characteristics of  the 
underlying measure of  loss (table 1).  Some contracts are based on yield losses while 
others are based on revenue index losses. In addition, some of  the available revenue 
index insurance products have an additional harvest price feature that causes the 
dollars of insurance protection to increase if price increases during the growing season.' 
Each contract is only available for selected crops and in selected regions. For example, 
a corn producer in New England may only have one type of  FCIP contract available, 
while a corn producer in the Midwest may have as many as six. All FCIP contracts are 
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Table 1. Types of FCIP Crop Insurance Contracts 
Farm-Level Contracts  Area-Level Contracts 
Farm-level yield insurance (MPCI)  Area-level yield insurance (GRP) 
Farm-level revenue index insurance  Area-level revenue index insurance 
Farm-level revenue index insurance with  Area-level revenue index insurance with 
harvest price feature  harvest price feature 
sold through private insurance companies. RMA provides significant premium subsidies 
to producers and a portion of the reinsurance needed by insurance companies. 
There is a substantial economic literature on the conditions under which insurance 
markets exist and, if they exist, their degree of completeness. Rothschild and Stiglitz 
(1976), in an  important early contribution, explored the consequence of heterogeneity 
in the risk characteristics of potential insureds and asymmetry in knowledge between 
potential insureds and insurance companies. They examined how a menu of insurance 
contracts could be used to induce insureds to self-select into  pools with similar risk char- 
acteristics (e.g., high-risk versus low-risk pools). This self-selection  partially ameliorates 
the heterogeneity problem and reduces the amount of costly information required for 
risk classification. 
This study focuses on two very different FCIP yield insurance contracts that differ in 
their exposure to asymmetric information problems and in the extent to which risk 
classification is required. Specifically, we compare the primary FCIP farm yield 
insurance contract, known as Multiple Peril Crop Insurance (MPCI), to the area yield 
insurance contract, known as the Group Risk Plan (GRP). 
The remainder of the article is organized as  follows. We begin with a brief review of 
MPCI and GRP. We also present a slightly different area yield contract that has been 
widely discussed in the literature but, as  of yet, has not been implemented in the  United 
States. Next, the issue of  basis risk is discussed. Basis risk is inherent in area yield 
insurance contracts. We argue, however, that a different, and often unrecognized, form 
of  basis risk also exists with farm-level yield insurance contracts such as MPCI. The 
next section provides a synthesis of the literature on area yield contracts and relates 
that literature to the GRP area yield contract which has been implemented in the 
United States. Finally, results are presented from an empirical analysis comparing the 
risk transfer effectiveness of MPCI and GRP. This analysis is conducted for alternative 
MPCI coverage levels and GRP contract provisions. The focus is on investigating the 
potential viability of GRP in the marketplace, not on which contract is "better." 
MPCI  and GRP 
MPCI provides protection against yield losses, from a variety of natural causes, at  the 
farm, or even sub-farm, level2  Area yield insurance, on the other hand, is essentially a 
put option on the expected county yield. The holder of an area yield insurance policy 
receives an indemnity whenever the realized county yield falls below some specified 
If a farm consists of parcels in different sections  or with different Farm  Service Agency serial numbers, MPCI purchasers 
can choose to insure the parcels as separate insurance units. Bamett et al.  Area Yield Insurance  287 
critical yield (i.e., strike),  regardless of  the realized yield on his or her farm.3  As with any 
option, basis risk is an important factor affecting the efficacy of area yield insurance. 
The higher (lower)  the positive correlation between the  farm and county yield, the lower 
(higher)  the basis risk. 
For simplicity, assume that  indemnities are  paid in units of production (e.g., bushels) 
per acre.4 For insurance unit i, the MPCI indemnity function is designated by: 
where R is the indemnity per acre, 9, is the realization of the stochastic yield, and  y, is 
the critical yield calculated as 
with 50% s coverage s 85%  in 5% increments. For MPCI, predicted yield (K) is calculated 
as a moving 4- to 10-year average of historical yields for the insurance unit. 
The indemnity function in Miranda's (1991)  model of area yield insurance is similar 
to equation (I),  except yield is now defined at  the area level rather than a farm or sub- 
farm level as in MPCI. Specifically, 
(3)  ti  =  -7, 0)  x scale,  and 
y,  = p  x coverage, 
where9 is the realization of the stochastic area yield, p is the predicted area yield, and 
scale is a choice variable that allows a policyholder to increase or decrease the amount 
of  protection per acre.5 
To better understand the role of  the scale variable, assume for a moment that this 
variable was removed from equation (3) (i.e., scale is constrained to equal one for all 
policyholders). Any nonzero indemnity would be calculated as the simple difference 
between the critical area  yield and  the  realized area  yield. However, policyholders differ 
with regard to how expected indemnities on area yield insurance track expected farm- 
level losses. By their choice of scale, policyholders  can attempt to better match area  yield 
insurance indemnities to expected farm-level losses. 
A slightly different indemnity function is used for the actual GRP contract: 
E=ma  (  yc-Y  ,  0)  x scale, 
(coverage  ) 
where 70% s coverage < 90% in 5% increments, 90% s scale s 150%, and 
protection per acre = p x scale. 
Area yield insurance should not be confused with the FCIP's MPCI contract in existence prior to 1984. That contract 
based farm-level expected yields on the soil and climate conditions in the area where the farm was located (rather than on 
the farm's actual historical yields). Loss adjustment, however, was conducted at the farm level. 
Alternatively, one can assume that each unit of production is worth exactly one unit of currency (e.g., one dollar). 
'The literature  on area yield insurance contains a confusing mix of terminology. The term "trigger yield" is sometimes used 
in place of what is here called "critical yield." The terms "scalen and "coveragen are here used in a manner consistent with 
actual GRP terminology. With the exception of  Skees, Black, and Barnett (19971, the remainder of  the literature has 
consistently used the term"coveragen  to mean what is  here called "scale." Smith, Chouinard, and Baquet (1994)  use the Greek 
alpha (a)  to designate what is here called "coverage." 288  August 2005  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
The indemnity function exhibits a declining deductible such that, in the extreme, if 
7 = 0, then rZ equals 100%  of  protection regardless of  the choice of  coverage. For GRP, 
the area is defined by county boundaries and pis calculated  using a linear spline (Skees, 
Black, and Barnett, 1997). 
Most of the academic literature on area yield insurance has followed Miranda (1991) 
in assuming an indemnity function as in equation (3) (e.g., Smith, Chouinard, and 
Baquet, 1991; Mahul, 1999;  Vercammen, 2000). However, GRP, the only area yield 
insurance contract currently available in the United States, is based on the indemnity 
function in equation (4). 
MPCI has been plagued with problems related to the use of individual farm yields in 
measuring yield loss. Large underwriting losses in the 1980s have been attributed, in 
part, to the heterogeneity of yield risk exposure across farmers. Farmers, who presum- 
ably have better information about their farm yield distributions than does the insurer, 
can through both hidden information (adverse selection) and hidden action (moral 
hazard) use such information to their advantage (Skees and Reed, 1986; Chambers, 
1989; Quiggin, Karagiannis, and Stanton, 1994; Smith and Goodwin, 1996; Coble et al., 
1997;  Just, Calvin, and Quiggin,1999). To compensate for resulting underwriting losses, 
MPCI premium rates are increased. For some farmers, the premium cost, even with 
federal subsidies, is higher than expected indemnities. There are also high admin- 
istrative costs associated with establishing expected yields, calculating insured losses, 
and monitoring at the farm level (Skees and Barnett, 1999; Barnaby and Skees, 1990; 
Wang et al., 1998). To achieve targeted rates of  participation, the government heavily 
subsidizes premiums. 
GRP offers a number of  potential advantages relative to MPCI. There is no reason to 
believe that farmers have any better information on county yield distributions than does 
the insurer. Assuming GRP is offered only where minimum acreage requirements are 
met, it is unlikely that any individual insured farmer can engage in actions which will 
impact the aggregate county yield (Skees,  Black, and Barnett, 1997).  Thus, there should 
be no opportunities for farmers to benefit, at the expense of  the FCIP, from hidden 
information or hidden action. Since there is no need to establish farm-level expected 
yields or conduct loss adjustment at  the farm level, administrative costs are significantly 
lower than those for MPCI (Barnaby and Skees, 1990; Miranda, 1991; Skees, Black, and 
Barnett, 1997; and Skees and Barnett, 1999). 
For many farmers, GRP will also have a significantly lower wedge than MPCI. The 
term "wedge" is used to describe the positive difference between premium cost and 
expected indemnity for a given insured (Wang, Hanson, and Black, 2003). A  wedge gen- 
erally contains two components: transactions costs and misclassification. Transactions 
costs create a positive wedge for all insureds. Heterogeneous risk exposure that results 
in misclassification can have either a positive or negative effect on the wedge. Conse- 
quently, some insureds may face a premium cost that exceeds the expected indemnity, 
while others may face exactly the opposite situation. GRP has lower transactions costs 
than MPCI. In addition, there is little potential for misclassification since there is no 
need to classify farm-level risk exposure. Thus, GRP will have a significantly lower 
wedge than MPCI for many farmers. 
Finally, since it offers a very different type of  insurance protection, GRP provides 
opportunities for potential insureds to self-select across insurance contracts, which 
should facilitate better classification for other FCIP contracts, such as MPCI. Bamett et al. 
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Basis risk is inherent with GRP (Skees, Black, and Barnett, 1997; Skees and Barnett, 
1999; Wang et al., 1998). It is possible for a farm to experience a yield shortfall and yet 
receive no indemnity. This would occur if a peril reduced the yield on a farm but was not 
sufficiently systemic to reduce yield measured at  the county level. Of course, the inverse 
is also true. It is possible for a farm to experience no yield shortfall and yet receive a 
GRP indemnity. As a result, some have questioned whether GRP should even be con- 
sidered insurance. Typical in this regard is an amusing statement by Robert Parkerson, 
president of  National Crop Insurance Services, a service organization for U.S.  crop 
insurance companies. As Mr. Parkerson recollects, "A state insurance commissioner sent 
me a personal note saying he was sure that GRP was meant to go to the Lottery and 
Gaming Commission for review, not to him" (quoted in Taylor, 2001). 
Yet when comparing GRP to MPCI, it is important to note that MPCI is also subject 
to basis risk. This basis risk derives from sampling and measurement errors in the 
calculation of  K and gi. A moving average, based on only 4 to 10 years of  actual yield 
history, is used to estimate K. The appendix describes how so few observations  can lead 
to large sampling errors in the calculation of mean yield. Measurement errors can also 
occur if insureds, either inadvertently or deliberately,  provide inaccurate or incomplete 
yield records. Anecdotal evidence indicates this is a common problem. 
Further, for many crops and regions, MPCI implicitly assumes relative risk 
(measured as the coefficient of  variation) varies inversely with ~z,  (i.e., standard 
deviation is assumed constant). For a given crop and practice (e.g., irrigated versus non- 
irrigated), the ratio of  K to the mean county yield is the primary mechanism used to 
assign policyholders to a particular risk classification with an associated  premium rate. 
Thus, errors in calculating K affect not only y,,  but also the premium rate charged to 
the policyholder. 
Even with professional loss adjusters, it is impossible to avoid errors in estimating 
9,. Sampling error can occur, if sampling  methods are used to estimateg,. Measurement 
errors can also occur. As with calculating K,  these measurement errors can be either 
inadvertent or deliberate. 
Due to errors in estimating K and yi,  it is quite possible for MPCI policyholders to 
receive indemnities when farm-level yield losses have not occurred, or to not receive 
indemnities when losses have occurred. Hence, basis risk is not limited only to area 
yield contracts like GRP. In fact, GRP makes use of  much longer data series than does 
MPCI when establishing the expected yield. Also, for most farms, the standard deviation 
of  county yields is much lower than that of farm yields. Thus, that portion of  basis risk 
which is due to sampling and measurement errors should be much less for GRP than for 
MPCI. 
Literature Review 
Harold Halcrow introduced the concept of  area yield insurance in his 1948  Ph.D. disser- 
tation at the University of  Chicago and in a subsequent article in the Journal of  Farm 
Economics.  More than 40 years later, the Congressionally  appointed Commission for the 
Improvement of the Federal Crop Insurance Program (1989) issued a report calling for 
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Barnaby and Skees (1990)  later described how an  area  yield contract might work and 
the  potential advantages over existing crop insurance contracts. Miranda (1991)  formal- 
ized these insights using a framework that partitioned risk into systemic and idiosyn- 
cratic (residual) components. If gi is projected orthogonally onto 9, then 
where 
and 
This framework, commonly used in optimal hedge ratio (Stoll and Whaley, 1993) and 
capital asset pricing model (CAPM) (Doherty, 2000; Leunberger, 1997)  contexts, decom- 
poses the farm yield deviation from expectation into a systemic component, measured 
by  pi  times the area yield deviation from expectation, and an idiosyncratic component, 
Ei. The coefficient Pi  measures how sensitive the farm yield deviations from expectation 
are to area yield deviations from expectation. 
Assume initially that insurance contracts are actuarially fair. Then, following Miranda 
(19911, 
n..  = EEij Vi,j, 
41 
where nu  is the per acre insurance premium for farm i and insurance contract j, and 
Aij is the per acre insurance indemnity. Abstracting away from price risk and assuming 
that farmers are  mean variance utility maximizers, the performance of each insurance 
contract can be evaluated by its impact on the variance of net yield, giyt,  where 
Yij 
The variance of net yield is measured as 
where o:i is as  defined in equation (61, and ozi,  = Var(Eu)  is  the  variance of the  indemnity 
for farm  i and insurance contractj. Purchasing insurance contract j  reduces the  farmer's 
yield risk by 
A,  = Var(Yi) - var(Yiyt)  = -  ozi, - 2 cov(Yi, iij). 
Converting this into percentage terms, the variance reduction due to the insurance 
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which is consistent with measures commonly used for evaluating the effectiveness of 
hedging strategies involving futures and options contracts. 
Miranda (1991)  compared two stylized versions of  area yield insurance to a farm yield 
insurance contract. The farm yield insurance contract  was based on the MPCI indemnity 
function in equation (1)  and, unlike MPCI, was assumed to be actuarially fair. Miranda 
obtained data for 1974-88 for 102 soybean farmers in western Kentucky, and these 102 
farmers were assumed to constitute all the soybean production in the area so that, for 
any given year, the average soybean yield for the area was the acre-weighted average 
yield of the 102 farmers. Using the indemnity function in equation (31, Miranda defined 
two area yield insurance contracts, which he referred to as "full coverage" and "optimal 
coverage." For the full coverage contract, coverage was set at 88.5% and scale at 100%. 
For the optimal coverage contract, coverage was set at 95% and farmers were assumed 
to optimally select a value for scale so as to maximize percent variance reduction, 0ij.6 
On average, the optimal coverage area yield insurance contract was preferred to the 
farm yield insurance contract, which, in turn, was preferred to the full coverage area 
yield insurance contract. The less restrictive optimal coverage area yield insurance 
contract was always preferred to the more restrictive full coverage contract. The lower 
the farm's correlation with the area yield, the more likely the farm was to prefer the 
farm-level insurance contract to either of  the area yield insurance contracts. 
As argued by Smith, Chouinard, and Baquet (1994),  ideal area yield insurance would 
allow the purchaser to optimally select both coverage and scale. Recognizing that politi- 
cal considerations might not allow for unrestricted choice of  coverage and scale, they 
propose an "almost ideal" area yield insurance contract where scale is set equal to 100% 
but coverage is bounded only by the condition that it must be greater than zero. Their 
empirical analysis was conducted using 1981-90 farm yield data for 123  dryland wheat 
farms in Chouteau County, Montana. Like Miranda (1991),  they assume these wheat 
farms constitute all of  the wheat production in the defined insurance area. Almost ideal 
area yield insurance is compared to: (a)  an ideal area yield insurance contract where 
both coverage and scale are allowed to take on any nonnegative values, (b)  an area yield 
insurance contract with coverage and scale constrained as in GRP, (c) farm yield 
insurance with coverage set at 75%, and (d)  farm yield insurance with coverage set at 
90%. It is important to note that Smith, Chouinard, and Baquet's area yield insurance 
contracts are based on Miranda's indemnity function [equation (3)l rather than the 
actual GRP indemnity function [equation (4:1].  As with Miranda's analysis, all of  the 
insurance contracts are assumed to be actuarially fair with premiums paid in units of 
production per acre. 
On average across all farms, the ideal area yield insurance contract reduced net yield 
variability by over 65%.  The 90%  coverage farm yield insurance reduced net yield varia- 
bility per acre by over 64%, and the almost ideal area yield insurance contract reduced 
net yield variability per acre by 63%. Smith, Chouinard, and Baquet note that for this 
data set, the simpler almost ideal area yield insurance provided almost as much risk 
reduction as the ideal area yield contract. The two contracts most closely related to 
actual FCIP contracts-the  area yield insurance with coverage and scale constrained 
as in GRP and the 75% coverage farm yield insurance-generated  lower percentage 
Despite the moniker, the constraint on coverage prevents this from being a true optimal (or ideal) area yield insurance 
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reductions in net yield variability per acre at 52.5 and 46.6, respectively. Interestingly, 
the constrained area yield insurance contract reduced net yield variability more than 
the 75% coverage farm yield insurance contract. 
Miranda (1991) indicated that a producer's optimal scale would approach pi. Mahul 
(1999) formalized this insight by demonstrating that for an area  yield contract with an 
indemnity function as specified in equation (3), if Pi is positive, then the optimal choice 
for a policyholder would be to set scale = pi. Again, this is consistent with the optimal 
hedge and CAPM literatures. Note that the optimal choice of scale does not depend on 
the policyholder's degree of risk aversion or on the cost of the insurance premium. 
Vercammen (2000) extended Mahul's (1999)  analysis by deriving the optimal form of 
an area yield insurance contract with indemnity function as in equation (3) when 
coverage is  politically constrained to be below the level desired by policyholders. For the 
constrained contract, Vercammen showed it is still optimal to choose scale = pi.  How- 
ever, the optimal constrained contract would have a discontinuous indemnity function 
whereby the policyholder  would receive a lump-sum indemnity if the  realized area  yield 
were below y,.  Vercammen recognized that a discontinuous indemnity function would 
likely not be politically feasible, and suggested the GRP indemnity function, with its 
declining deductible feature, was a reasonable second-best alternative. 
Bourgeon and Chambers (2003) examined area yield insurance when the insurance 
premium contains a load to cover fured costs and thus is not actuarially fair to the 
policyholder. In this case, the optimal contract would contain a premium load which is 
conditioned on pi, such that individuals with higher betas would pay proportionally 
higher premium loads. But if information on Pi is asymmetrically distributed, farmers 
would always choose the  area yield insurance contract designed for individuals with the 
lowest betas. This would prevent the insurer from being able to raise the additional 
premium needed to cover fixed costs. 
Mahul and Wright (2003)  extended Mahul's (1999)  optimal insurance analysis to the 
case of  area revenue insurance. They assume that farm yield is positively correlated 
with the yield index and farm price is positively correlated with the price index. In con- 
trast to Mahul's earlier finding on area yield insurance, optimal area revenue insurance 
was found to be conditioned on producer risk preferences. 
The GRP area yield insurance contract was introduced in 1994. Baquet and Skees 
(1994) describe the basic characteristics of  the contract. Skees, Black, and Barnett 
(1997) provide significantly more detail on contract design and implementation, 
including a discussion of how the coverage and scale choice variables were politically 
~onstrained.~ 
Empirical Analysis 
This analysis compares the performance of MPCI and GRP contracts using farm-level 
yield data on 66,686 corn farms from 10 states in the Corn Belt and 3,152 sugar beet 
farms from two states in the upper Midwest. Recall that our research objective is not to 
'  Coverage was constrained politically to be between 70%  and 90%.  Farmers were also required to insure all of their acres 
of a given crop in a given county. This politically dictated requirement  is conceptually  analogous  to forcing a 100%  hedge ratio 
on all farmers who forward price through hedging. After much debate, the scale choice variable in equation (4)  was adopted 
to allow policyholders some flexibility in setting effective hedge ratios. Bamett et al.  Area Yield Insurance  293 
determine which contract (MPCI or GRP) is "best" or to explain current purchasing 
patterns. Rather, our objective is to evaluate the potential viability of GRP in the face 
of implicit critiques that the  basis risk is unacceptable. Like Miranda (1991) and Smith, 
Chouinard, and Baquet (1994),  we evaluate the performance of insurance contracts by 
how much they reduce the variance of net yield. 
Also, as  in earlier studies, it is implicitly assumed that the premium paid is equal to 
the  expected indemnity for all FCIP contracts. This is a reasonable assumption for area 
yield contracts like GRP since farm-level risk classification is not required. But for 
MPCI, farm-level risk classification is required and, as  indicated earlier, a substantial 
literature suggests that, in practice, MPCI risk classification is highly imperfect. Thus, 
there exists a probability distribution of  wedges across potential MPCI purchasers, 
implying farmers do not simply maximize the reduction in net yield variance. Rather, 
they make tradeoffs between risk and expected return. However, modeling this 
tradeoff is problematic since one must capture the  joint probability distribution of 
wedges and farmer risk preferences. Therefore, our assumption of actuarial soundness 
greatly simplifies the task of comparing performance across the two contracts. To the 
extent this assumption is unrealistic for MPCI, our results will be biased in favor of 
MPCI. 
Unlike previous studies, we do not attempt to optimize GRP scale for individual 
farms. When only eight to 10 years of yield data are  available for each farm, estimating 
a farm-level Pi  as in equation (5) is a significant challenge because the use of ordinary 
least squares  regression with such small  samples would be problematic. Accordingly, we 
take the very conservative approach of constraining coverage and scale to be the same 
for all corn farms in a given state and for all sugar beet farms associated with a given 
cooperative processor. Farm-level values for eij  are aggregated across larger geographic 
regions (states for corn, processing cooperative regions for sugar beets) as follows: 
-  w,  eij 
€Iij  = C -  b' i E 1  = state, cooperative, 
i  Cwi 
i 
where 8i,. is the weighted average percentage of variance reduction in region I  due to 
insurance contract j, and wi  is the acres planted to the insured crop on farm i. 
The farm-level corn yield data utilized in this analysis are yield histories used to 
calculate MPCI estimates of k.  The principal data source contained yield histories used 
to calculate  for the 1995  crop year. Therefore, this source contained actual  farm yields 
for 10 or fewer consecutive years over the period 1985-94. To be included in the analy- 
sis, farms were required to have at least six years of actual yield data over this period. 
In a few cases, the principal data source was supplemented by sources containing yield 
histories used to calculate  for crop years prior to 1995.  Thus some farms  have as  many 
as 12 years of  actual yield data extending back to 1983. These farms account for less 
than 5% of the total corn farm observations. Farm-level corn yields were obtained for 
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Ohio, and 
Texas. In 2001, these states accounted for almost 79% of U.S. corn production. County- 
level corn yield data were obtained from the USDA's  National Agricultural Statistics 
Service (NASS) online database. 
Farm-level sugar beet yield data were acquired from three sugar beet processing 
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Minne~ota.~  American Crystal has six plants that process beets from a 14-county area 
in the mid- and northern valley. Farm-level yield data from farms associated with 
American Crystal were available for the years 1980-96.  Min-Dak has one processing 
plant that serves a five-county  area in the  southern valley. Min-Dak data were available 
for the years 1988-97. Southern Minn has one processing plant serving a six-county 
area in southwestern Minnesota. Southern Minn data were available for the years 
1989-97. These cooperatives are the only sugar processors in the region, and together 
account for over 30% of  the beet sugar produced in the United States. 
Using the cooperatives' farm-level yield data, county-level  yields were constructed as 
an  acre-weighted  average of farm-level  yields in the county. Mahul(1999)  demonstrated 
that this procedure (also utilized by Miranda, 1991; and Smith, Chouinard, and Baquet, 
1994)  will cause the average optimal scale to tend toward a value of one. However, these 
farm-level sugar beet data actually represent all of  the production in the county since 
these cooperatives are the only sugar processors in the region. In fact, NASS constructs 
sugar beet county yield estimates using the yield data provided by  these processing 
cooperatives. Thus, as used here, this procedure should not introduce bias in the esti- 
mation of the optimal scale. 
To ensure only commercial farms were included in the analysis, corn farms with less 
than 50 planted  acres and sugar beet farms with less than 20 planted acres were 
dropped from the farm yield data sets. Also removed from the data sets  were farms with 
mean yields (calculated across all years of  available data) that were extreme outliers. 
Specifically, only those farms with mean farm yields between 65% and 135% of  the 
mean county yield (calculated over the same period) were retained. 
MPCI indemnities are modeled as in equation (1).  As indicated in equation (21, y, is 
a function of  R  which, for the actual MPCI contract, is calculated as a 4- to 10-year 
moving average of actual realized yields. Thus, to accurately simulate MPCI indemnities 
over a 10-year period, one would need 14 to 20 years of actual yield data4  to 10 years 
to initiate R  and 10 more years to simulate indemnities out-of-sample. However, given 
the limited years of available farm yield data, we calculated R  in-sample as  the average 
of the available farm yield data. In other words, it  is implicitly assumed that the 10-year 
moving average used to calculate  ~z,  for MPCI perfectly predicts the central tendency of 
future realized farm yields. Since sampling error in the calculation of  ~z,  is an important 
source of  MPCI basis risk, our approach will generate estimates of risk reduction due 
to MPCI purchasing which are unrealistically favorable. In short, due to limited farm- 
level yield data, we are forced to adopt a modeling approach that "stacks the deck" in 
favor of MPCI. 
GRP indemnities are modeled as in equation (4).  As with the actual GRP program, 
a linear spline is used to predict expected county yields from historic data (Skees, Black, 
and Barnett, 1997).  Recall that the sugar beet county yield data are constructed as acre- 
weighted averages of farm-level yields in the county. Hence, the time series of  county 
yields covers the same period as the farm-level  yields. For corn, county yield data were 
available beginning in 1972. Thus, pis  calculated completely in-sample for sugar beets 
and partly in-sample for corn. In reality, GRP expected county yields are out-of-sample 
To  be specific, the corn farm yield data are at what RMA calls the 'enterprise unit"  level of aggregation. This includes 
all of the crop assigned to a given taxpayer identification number within a given county. The sugar beet farm yield data are 
for a given marketing contract with a processing cooperative within a given county. Barnett et al.  Area Yield Insurance  295 
predictions. This accommodation creates a slight upward bias in risk reduction from 
GRP, but this bias should be small relative to the similar in-sample bias in the calcula- 
tion of pi. 
Mahul(1999) showed that for an area yield contract with an indemnity function as 
specified in equation (3),  if Pi  is  positive, then the optimal choice for a policyholder would 
be to set scale = pi.  As noted earlier, farm-level regression estimates of  Pi  are problem- 
atic due to the  limited years of available farm-level data. Thus, we empirically estimate 
optimal scale for GRP as: 
= al  + PIAcl  + Eil 
V i E C = county E 1 = state, cooperative, 
where ti,,  is the GRP indemnity calculated as  in equation (4)  for county C in the multi- 
county region I. For all farms in each multi-county area, optimal scale is set equal to 
p,.  For corn, the multi-county area is the state. For sugar beets, the multi-county area 
is the  region served by a given processing cooperative. Similarly, coverage is constrained 
to be the same for all farms within a multi-county area. These constraints will again 
bias our results against GRP. 
Three MPCI scenarios and three GRP scenarios are modeled. MPCI is modeled at 
65%, 75%, and 85% coverage levels. Because of moral hazard concerns, MPCI is not 
currently offered at  coverage levels higher than 85%. The first GRP scenario has cover- 
age set at  90% and scale at 100%.  In  the second scenario, we solve for optimal coverage 
and scale subject to the constraints imposed by the actual GRP program. Specifically, 
coverage is allowed to vary between 70% and 90%  in 5%  increments, and scale is  allowed 
to vary between 90% and 150%. For each possible coverage level, scale is set at its 
optimal level by solving for P, as in equation (7). The optimal coverage level (and the 
associated optimal scale) is chosen by searching across the possible coverage levels for 
the one that generates the largest reduction in net yield risk. 
There is  no theoretical rationale for imposing constraints on the  choice of either scale 
or coverage. Consequently, in the third GRP scenario, scale is unconstrained. Further, 
the upper bound on coverage is relaxed. As demonstrated by Mahul(1999) and Wang 
et  al. (1998),  if area yield contracts are  actuarially fair, a risk-averse policyholder would 
choose a coverage level that equates  yc with the maximum possible area yield. While 
buyers might desire extremely high coverage levels, it is highly unlikely any seller 
would be willing to offer such high coverage levels due to extreme ambiguity about the 
upper tail of the county yield distribution. Thus, for the third scenario, coverage levels 
of up to 130% are allowed. This upper bound ensures yc remains within one standard 
deviation of expected county yields. 
No attempt is made at farmer risk classification and wedge size estimation for the 
MPCI contract--once  again biasing the analysis in favor of MPCI since many farmers, 
including those not purchasing MPCI, have wedges significantly larger than 1.0. 
Results 
For corn, results for each of the MPCI and GRP scenarios described earlier are presented 
in table 2. For each scenario, the  table presents the  weighted average percentage ofvari- 
ance reduction 8,,. where the  region (I)  is  defined as  the state. During the sample period, 
most MPCI policies were sold at  the  65%  coverage level. Even the  most constrained GRP 296  August 2005  Journal ofAgricultura1 and Resource Economics 
Table 2. Corn Percentage Variance Reduction  Under GRP and MPCI Scenarios by 
State 
GRP Scenarios  MPCI Scenarios 
111  [21  [31  [ll  [21  [31 
Optimal Coverage  Optimal Coverage 
No.  and Scale:  and Scale: 
of  Cover. = 90%,  70% s  Cover. s  90%,  70%  i Cover. i  130%,  65%  75%  85% 











Table 3. Corn GRP Optimal Coverage and Scale by State 
GRP Scenarios 
[21  [31 
Optimal Coverage and Scale:  Optimal Coverage and Scale: 
70% i Coverage i  90%,  70% s  Coverage i 13056, 
No.  90% i Scale i 150%  Scale Unconstrained 
of 
State  Farms  Coverage (%)  Scale (%)  Coverage (%)  Scale (%) 
Ill.  11,364  90  144  116  117 
Minn.  11,189  90  134  116  112 
KY.  178  90  142 
Iowa  31,506  90  147 
Kans.  1,205  90  150 
Ohio  1,163  90  150  113  117 
Ind.  2,939  90  150 
Nebr.  6,257  90  150 
Tex.  665  90  149 
Mich.  220  90  106  111  86 
scenario, where all farms are  required to have 90% coverage and 100%  scale, generates 
more risk reduction than 65% MPCI in every state except for Nebraska, Texas, and 
Michigan. 
GRP scenario 2 reflects the case where coverage and scale are optimized for each 
state, subject to existing contract constraints. Note that coverage and scale are  not opti- 
mized for each farm in the data set. Rather, they are optimized across all farms located 
in a given state. The state-level optimal levels of coverage and scale are then applied to 
each farm in the state. Thus, while GRP coverage and scale can vary across states, we 
are  still requiring each farm within a given state  to have exactly the same  levels of GRP 
coverage and scale. Table 3 presents the optimized values for coverage and scale. GRP Bamett et al.  Area Yield Insurance  297 
Table 4. Correlation Between Farm and County Corn Yield by State 
scenario 2 generates more risk reduction than 65% MPCI for every state except Nebraska 
and Michigan. In fact, GRP generates more risk reduction than 75% coverage MPCI in 
Illinois, Minnesota, Kentucky, Iowa, Ohio, and Indiana. 
MPCI with 85% coverage (table 2, MPCI scenario 3)  generates more risk reduction 
than any of the GRP scenarios that are subject to existing constraints on coverage and 
scale. Under GRP scenario 3  (table 2), the GRP scale is unconstrained and coverage is 
allowed to increase up to 130% (but again requiring every farm in the state  to have the 
same coverage and scale). In this scenario, risk reduction generated by GRP exceeds 
that  of 65% MPCI in every state except Michigan. It also exceeds the  risk reduction gen- 
erated by 75% MPCI in every state except Texas and Michigan and the risk reduction 
generated by 85% MPCI in Illinois, Kentucky, Iowa, and Ohio. The last two columns of 
table 3  report the optimal coverage and scale values when scale is unconstrained and 
coverage is constrained between 70% and 130%. 
These results are  broadly consistent with the notion that area yield insurance works 
best in relatively homogeneous production regions (Skees, Black, and Barnett, 1997). 
Table 4 presents correlations between farm and county corn yields for the data used in 
the analysis. The states where GRP did not perform well relative to MPCI (Nebraska, 
Texas, and Michigan) have relatively lower correlations between farm and county 
yields. Interestingly, in  these three states GRP performance relative to  MPCI was much 
better for farms with mean yields K higher than the average of the ~'s  for the state. 
This was particularly noticeable in Texas and Michigan. While this finding requires 
further  research, it  seems to imply that  in these states,  farms with above-average mean 
yields are more highly correlated with county average yields, and thus better suited to 
GRP. 
Table 5  presents sugar beets results for the weighted average percentage of variance 
reduction qj  where the  region (1)  is  now defined as  the processing cooperative. For farms 
associated with the Southern Mim  cooperative, all three GRP scenarios generate more 
risk reduction than 65% and 75% MPCI. When scale is unconstrained, GRP performs 
better than 85% MPCI. For farms associated with American Crystal, all three GRP 
scenarios generate as  much or more risk reduction than 65% MPCI. Only when scale is 
unconstrained does GRP generate more risk reduction than 75% MPCI. No GRP 
scenarios generate as much risk reduction as  85% MPCI. Finally, for farms associated 
with the  Min-Dak cooperative, none of the GRP scenarios generate as  much risk reduc- 
tion as  even 65% MPCI. Optimal coverage and scale values for sugar beets are  presented 
in table 6. 
Differences in GRP performance between the sugar beet cooperatives are likely due, 
in part, to different drainage structures in the geographic regions served by the 
Correlation Between Farm 
State  and County Corn Yield 
Illinois  0.82 
Minnesota  0.80 
Kentucky  0.78 
Iowa  0.78 
Kansas  0.76 
Correlation Between Farm 
State  and County Corn Yield 
Ohio  0.71 
Indiana  0.74 
Nebraska  0.68 
Texas  0.49 
Michigan  0.36 298  August2005  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Table 5. Sugar Beet Percentage Variance Reduction Under GRP and MPCI 
Scenarios by Processing Cooperative 
GRP Scenarios  MPCI Scenarios 
14  121  131  111  [21  I31 
Optimal Coverage  Optimal Coverage 
No.  and Scale:  and Scale: 
of  Cover. = 90%,  70% i Cover. i 90%,  70% i Cover. i130%,  65%  75%  85% 
Cooperative  Farms  Scale = 100%  90% i Scale i 150%  Scale Unconstrained  Cover.  Cover.  Cover. 
Southern Minn  296  48.0  53.3 
Min-Dak  519  11.5  13.1 
American Crystal  2,337  17.6  23.5 
Table 6. Sugar Beet GRP Optimal Coverage and Scale by Processing Cooperative 
GRP Scenarios 
121  [31 
Optimal Coverage and Scale:  Optimal Coverage and Scale: 
70% i Coverage i  90%,  70% i Coverage i 130%, 
No. 
90% i Scale i 150%  Scale Unconstrained 
of 
Cooperative  Farms  Coverage (%)  Scale (%)  Coverage (%)  Scale (%I 
Southern Minn  296  90  135  125  106 
Min-Dak  519  90  130  105  87 
American Crystal  2,337  90  150  115  88 
cooperatives.  For example, Min-Dak serves a region containing soils with widely varying 
drainage capacity. When excess precipitation occurs, as in 1993, substantial yield reduc- 
tions result on farms with poor drainage while the impact is much less for farms with 
better draining soils. Southern Minn, on the other hand, serves a region with largely 
homogeneous and well-drained soils. Hence, there is substantial positive correlation 
across farms in this region when systemic precipitation events occur. 
These results suggest that for corn and sugar beets grown in some regions, GRP pro- 
vides opportunities for reductions in net yield variance which are certainly comparable 
to those provided by MPCI. Thus, contrary to widespread perceptions, the basis risk 
inherent in GRP does not necessarily destroy its market viability. 
The results of  this study are particularly striking given that in many instances 
modeling assumptions biased the analysis in favor of  MPCI. Perhaps the most impor- 
tant example of this is the assumption that MPCI is actuarially sound at the individual 
farm level. However, it is also important to note MPCI contracts provide coverage for 
quality losses, losses due to prevented planting and, in some cases, replanting costs. 
Also, under certain circumstances, MPCI coverage can be purchased separately for 
sub-farm level "optional units." The ability to purchase coverage at the optional unit 
level increases the expected aggregate indemnity  for the whole farm relative to insuring 
the whole farm as one insurance unit. This analysis does not account for these MPCI 
benefits that are not available with GRP contracts. Barnett et al. 
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This analysis, comparing GRP to MPCI, extends and improves upon the existing litera- 
ture in four important respects. The first is the scope of the region considered. Miranda 
(1991) studied 102 soybean farmers in western Kentucky, and Smith, Chouinard, and 
Baquet (1994) studied 123  wheat farmers in Chouteau County, Montana. This analysis 
examines 66,686 corn farms in 10 Corn Belt states and 3,152 sugar beet farms from two 
states in the upper Midwest. 
Second, previous area yield insurance studies have assumed that the insurance area 
consists only of farms included in the analysis-implying  the weighted average Pi across 
all of  the farms will be equal to one (Miranda, 1991). Since, as Mahul(1999) demon- 
strates, the optimal choice for scale is the farm's Pi, this artificial construction of  the 
insurance area biases the average optimal choice of  scale toward a value of  100%.  This 
study avoids that bias by using actual NASS county yield data for corn to construct and 
analyze area yield insurance contracts. For sugar beets, county yields are constructed 
as an acre-weighted average of  farm-level yields. However, unlike earlier studies, the 
farm yield data used in the analysis reflect the entire population of  sugar beet farmers 
in the county. Therefore, this procedure should not introduce bias in the estimation of 
optimal values for scale. 
Third, while previous studies have investigated the efficacy of an area yield insurance 
contract with an indemnity function as in equation (3),  this is the first study to conduct 
such an analysis using the actual GRP indemnity function found in equation (4). 
Fourth, unlike Miranda (1991) and Smith, Chouinard, and Baquet (1994),  we do not 
attempt to optimize GRP scale for individual  farms. Given the limited years of  available 
farm-level yield data, the standard error around farm-level regression estimates of  Pi 
would be quite high. Thus we take the very conservative approach of  constraining the 
coverage and scale to be the same for all farms in an area. 
The primary objective of  this analysis was to assess whether or  not basis risk 
rendered GRP unviable in the market place. The results indicate that at least for some 
crops and regions this is not the case, since GRP provides risk reduction at  least as good 
as that provided by  standard choices of  MPCI coverage. This finding is particularly 
noteworthy because in many instances modeling assumptions were made which biased 
results in favor of  MPCI. However, this analysis cannot account for quality loss, 
prevented planting, replant, and optional unit benefits that are included in MPCI 
contracts but not GRP contracts. 
Finally, it is important to note that private-sector insurance companies are now 
exploring the possibility of  selling GRP contracts with a basis risk rider. This rider 
would provide additional protection against the possibility of  an idiosyncratic event 
causing a farm to suffer a significant yield loss when the county yield does not trigger 
a GRP indemnity. 
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Appendix: 
Errors in Multiple Peril Crop Insurance 
Estimates of Expected Yield 
The "square root of n rule" states that a sample mean estimates the true central tendency of the distri- 
bution with standard error calculated as 
Standard Error of Estimate  = a, 
6 
where a is the standard deviation of  the true underlying distribution and n is the size of the sample 
from which the mean was calculated. The higher (lower) the standard deviation of  the underlying 
distribution, the higher (lower)  is the error around the sample estimate of the true mean. The higher 
(lower) the sample size, the lower (higher)  is the error around the sample estimate of the true mean. 
To demonstrate the potential for error in MPCI estimates of expected  yield, consider a corn farm with 
an expected yield of  150  bushels per acre. For simplicity, assume the yield is distributed normally. If 
the standard deviation is 55 bushels per acre and the MPCI estimate of  expected yield is calculated 
using only four years of  data, the standard error around the estimate of  the expected yield is 27.5 
bushels per acre. This implies there is a 33% chance that the MPCI estimate of  expected yield will be 
less than 122.5  bushels per acre or more than 177.7 bushels per acre. 
Suppose  the MPCI estimate of  the expected yield is 180  bushels per acre. Ifthe policyholder selects 
85% coverage, the critical yield will be  153 bushels per acre, which is actually higher than the true 
mean of 150  bushels per acre. The farmer has been charged a premium rate based on 85% coverage but, 
due to the error in the MPCI estimate of  expected yield, has been given coverage in excess of  100%. 
Similarly, if the MPCI estimate of  the expected yield is 120  bushels per acre and the policyholder 
selects 85% coverage, the critical yield will be 102  bushels per acre. While the policyholder has been 
charged a premium rate for 85% coverage, the effective coverage level is only 68% (102  bushels per acre 
+ 150  bushels per acre). Ifthe expected yield had been estimated accurately,  a yield loss of  22.5  bushels 
per acre would have triggered an indemnity. Due to the estimation error, the policyholder must have 
a yield loss in excess of  48  bushels per acre to receive an indemnity. 